Robert J. Berry v. Louis G. Moench : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1958
Robert J. Berry v. Louis G. Moench : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
John H. Snow; Skeen, Worsley, Snow & Christensen; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Berry v. Moench, No. 8786 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3004
IN ~THE SUPREME COURT 
, ,-:O·f ~the -
STATE OF UTAH_ 
i 
H 
I' 
u 
ROBERT J.- !3ERRY, . 
/ 
......_, ,_· 
----· .-~ ~ 
Plaintiff_and Appellant-,, 
1--->--_., ' --~;~~~-;~-c~~i,~~s---~-~-=~· · ~· 
-
-- vs. N~o. 8786. 
LOUIS G. <MOENCH 
I 
Def,etJclant~-·and Respondenlt.:. · 
.. 
·-
/- ------ --
/ - :.lo-l' _) '~ - ---.:--- -: -~ I 
- /R~SPONDENT'S-B~IEF ·/ 
) ; 
- -
' /.. I I ' 
JOHN ~r. SNovy aid ~KEEN, _ 
WORSLEY, SNO\\[i & CHRIST~~SEN 
/ - -
. : .Attorneys for Pl"airftiff~- ' 
''. 
701 Continental Bank Building-;· 
Salt Lake City,.Ut~h · 
-, __ ·-:-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------------------------------- 9 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 
POINT I. THE DISTRI·CT COURT, AT BOTH 
PRETRIAL HEARINGS, AT TRIAL AND 
UPON THE HEARING OF THE MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL, RULED CORRECTLY THAT 
THE DEFE!~DANT WROTE THE LETTER, 
EXHIBIT 2, UNDER A CONDITIONAL PRIV-
ILEGE. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------. _ 10 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS 
OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
RE'CORD. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
CASES CITED 
Combes vs. Montgomery Ward & Company (Utah, 1951) 
228 p. 2d 272 __________________________________________________________________________ 10, 19 
Crellin vs. Thomas (Utah, 1952) 247 P. 2d 264 __________________________ 23 
Hales vs. Commercial Bank of Spani'Sh Fork (Utah, 1948) 
197 p. 2d 910 ..... ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
rviorley VIS. Rodberg (Utah, 1958) 323 P. 2d 717________________________ 2 
National Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Billington, 89 S. W. 
2d 491 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------··----- 20 
Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub. Co., 27 P. 2d !. _______________ 21 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Restatement of the Law of Torts __________________________________ 10, 13, 14, 22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREIME CO·URT 
of the 
s·TATE OF UTAH 
!{OBERT J. BERRY, 
Plai·ntiff and Appellant, 
No. 8786 
vs. 
LOUIS G. MOENCH 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated as they appeared 
in the trial court. 
Plaintiff's suit alleged defarnation of character, re-
sulting fron1 a letter \vritten by defendant, a Salt Lake 
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City psychiatrist, to a Wyo1ning physician who had asked 
defendant to state his impressions of the plaintiff when 
the latter was under defendant's professional care. 
Judgment \vas entered upon a verdict of no cause 
of action in the court of Third District Judge Ray \~an 
Cott, Jr. A motion for new trial was seasonably filed, 
argued and denied. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant cannot accept plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts. It is incomplete and does violence to the familiar 
rule that the Supreme Court should "consider those 
facts that most strongly support the verdict, where there 
is evidence pointing in different directions." Morley vs. 
Rodberg (Utah, 1958) 323 P. 2d 717. Defendant accord-
ingly will set forth a different statement of facts. 
Plaintiff was examined at the Salt Lake Clinic in 
the fall of 1949, at the insistence of his then wife, }frs. 
Ethela Berry. Plaintiff \vas first seen by Dr. Miller, 
one of the physicians at the clinic, and after a preliinin-
ary interview, Dr. 1Iiller detern1ined that the matter 
was of an en1ergency nature, and he requested that the 
defendant doctor see the patient innnediately on an 
emergency basis (R. ±3). 
The patient's \vife was fearful that her 1narr1age 
was being destroyed and it \Vas the defendant's impres-
sion that she was earne8tly seeking help in order to 
save her marriage ( R. 4()). 
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Plaintiff was physically exainined and was inter-
vievved concerning his troubles. The defendant also inter-
viewed the plaintiff's wife and discussed the case with 
Dr. Miller, who had interviewed the plaintiff's wife 
and her sister. Defendant diagnosed plaintiff's condition 
as "manic depressive depression in a psychopathic per-
sonality." (Ex. 2). 
Defendant reconnuended electro shock treatments 
and plaintiff submitted to four of such treatments be-
tween September 24 and October 1, 1949. He was seen 
on two subsequent occasions, but refused further treat-
Inent and was not seen by the defendant after October 
11, 1949 (R. 16). 
On Septen1ber 11, 1956, Dr. J. S. Hellewell, a physi-
cian in the Evanston 1\fedical Group, Evanston, Wyo-
Ining, addressed a letter to the defendant doctor as 
follows: 
"One of Iny patients, Mr. J. I. Williams of 
Evanston, Wyoming, has a daughter who is seri-
ously considering ruarriage with a Mr. Bob Berry, 
whom you have seen professionally. They are 
quite concerned about the matter, in view of his 
numerous and frequent troubles. I wonder if you 
could give Ine a brief resuine of his condition and 
your impressions of the Inan." (Ex. 1). 
Dr. Moench had :-;een patients in consultation \Vith 
TJr. 1-Telle-vvell vrior to this tirne (R. GO). When he re-
ceived the letter, Exhibit 1, the defendant doctor went 
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to the record roon1 at Salt Lake Clinic, obtained the 
record concerning the plaintiff, sat do\vn to a typewriter 
and from the contents of the record he wrote a letter 
in response to Dr. Hellewell's inquiry (R. 49). The letter, 
which is the cause of this lawsuit, is represented by 
Exhibit 2. 
Although plaintiff contends defendant's medical 
record was unreliable because it was based, in part, on 
hearsay from plaintiff's wife and her sister, the doctors 
who testified said psychiatrists rely ·'substantially" on 
such information, that n1edical students are taught to 
do so, that this is "a very valuable method and that, 
where patients are depressed (as plaintiff \vas), doctors 
"usually get niore of " the history in this fashion (R. 
46, 124). 
Dr. Hellewell's letter conveyed to defendant the 
i1npression that Dr. I-Iellewell \Vas "apparently the coun-
selor for this conten1plated marriage" (R. 21 and 22). 
Dr. Hellewell is not a psychiatrist and it "~as defendant's 
expectation that Dr. Hellewell ·',vould use the letter 
(Ex. 2) in his capacity of marital counselor to the best 
of his ability" on the question of "\Yhether or not he 
should advise the rnarriage (R. 50). He gave the infornla-
tion to Dr. Hellewell to tr~~ to help hiln be the best 
rnarital adviser he could be (R. 42). 
Although defendant had not seen the plaintiff for 
nearly seven years, he had reason to believe that the 
psychopathic personality disorder, \\~ith \vhich the plain-
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tjff had been afflicted in 19±9, vvas still present because 
there is no known cure for this disorder, and as stated 
by Dr. Nelson, another psychiatrist, ". . . if a patient 
has a basic psychopathic character in 1955 or 1956, then 
he certainly had it in 1949." (R. 122). 
In addition, prior to the date of the letter in ques-
tion, the defendant had received a professional inquiry 
frorn the Director of the Colorado State Hospital, indi-
cating that the plaintiff was a patient in that institution, 
and from the infor1nation received by the defendant, 
it was apparent that plaintiff's condition had not iin-
proved. (R. 47, 48). 
The ''manic depressive depression" phase of plain-
tiff's illness has hereditary characteristics (R. 51). In 
such instances there is a custom or practice in this corn-
rnunity between medical men to transmit information 
about a patient who is so afflicted to other doctors upon 
request of the latter, when the inquiry is received in the 
course of medical practice (R. 51). Such information 
would not be sent to the public generally, but only to 
other doctors who, by their request, indicate a direct 
connection with the patient (R. 51, 52). 
In reviewing the rnatter for the jury, Dr. Moench 
stated that he recalled no feeling of malice whatsoever 
at the time he wrote the letter. He had not seen the 
plaintiff for nearly seven years, did not rernernber what 
he looked like, had had no personal nor social dealings 
"\vith either the plaintiff or his forrner vvife, Ethela 
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Berry, and the contents of the letter vvere based entirely 
upon the record concerning the plaintiff's treat1nent in 
the fall of 1949 ( R. 49). 
Prior to the tin1e the letter was \\rritten, the plain-
tiff had been divorced by Ethela Berry, and at the time 
of the letter, September, 1956, he was courting l\1rs. 
M:ary Booth, the daughter of Mr. J. I. Williams, one 
of the patients mentioned in Dr. Helle\\rell's letter of 
inquiry. Plaintiff asserts, as his principal claim of dam-
age in this case, that the statements in the defendant's 
letter damaged his character and reputation in the eyes 
of Mr. Williams, and although he married J\Irs. Booth 
as planned, he claims that his association with his \Yife's 
parents has been seriously impaired as a result of the 
letter. 
In advancing this claim of da1nage, plaintiff's brief 
ignores completely the fact that information, almost 
identical with that contained in the defendant's letter, 
had already been received by the prospective bride and 
her family from plaintiff's former \Yife and fron1 her 
father, both by letter and by long distance telephone 
(R. 101-103). The letter fron1 the forn1er :Jirs. Berry 
was four or five typewritten single spaced pages, con-
taining considerable detail about the subject n1atter 
discussed in the defendant's letter (R. 100). 
Plaintiff clai1ns the staten1ents in Dr. l\loench ~s 
letter were not true, bnt plaintiff hin1self 1nade ~nh­
~tantially the sa1ne statetnent8 to another 8alt Lake Citv 
. . 
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psychiatrist, Dr. C. Craig 1\l elson, \vho was consulted by 
plaintiff in 1955 ( R. 112-116). Plaintiff'::; brief is en-
tirely silent about this evidence. 
A day or so after Dr. l\loench's letter was received, 
another letter, similar in content, was received by Dr. 
Hell ewell fro1n Dr. Nelson, \vho wrote in response to 
a professional re(1uest fro1n Dr. Hellewell. 
Dr. Nelson testified, concerning the state1nents 1nade 
by Dr. l\1oench which plaintiff alleges were defamatory, 
that plaintiff had related to him essentially the same 
information concerning his background and his trouble, 
as had been set forth in Dr. ~loench's letter (R.l12-116). 
This testimony \Vas never contradicted and plaintiff 
never explained to the jury how state1nents he made to 
Dr. Nelson, which were presu1nably true, because they 
were given voluntarily in an effort to obtain medical 
aid, beca1ne "untrue" and "'lies" when repeated by Dr. 
Moench in his letter. 
Prior to the receipt of Dr. ~Ioench's letter, the 
prospective bride had begun to wonder a little about 
the plaintiff, stating, in response to a question from 
plaintiff's counsel, that ''there was a little question in 
my mind, yes," which gave her reason at that time to 
want to investigate the vlaintiff (1~. 105, 106). She there-
fore sought out Dr. Nelson, and asked the doctor to 
discuss plaintiff's 1nental <'ondition and his suitability 
as a spouse (R. 115). 
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According to Dr. Nelson, she asked 4_uestions about 
the things which had been related by plaintiff to Dr. 
Nelson when he consulted him professionally in 1955, 
and she also "indicated awareness of some other facts 
about his background" and she "wondered what the out-
come of them might be." 
Dr. }~ elson testified he ,,~as careful to tell her she 
ought to make the decision on her O\vn, after weighing 
all factors, because "things like this, problems like this, 
situations like this, were difficult to predict, and ... 
I didn't want to be pessimistic ... and on the other 
hand I couldn't be optomistic about it . . ." (R. 115). 
Five days after the letter in suit was written by 
the defendant, plaintiff appeared at defendant's office 
in Salt Lake Clinic and informed the defendant he 
intended to sue him because of the letter (R. 39). Plain-
tiff demanded that the defendant write to Dr. Hellewell 
and to the Williams family a staten1ent to the effect 
that the information he had furnished \Yas largely ob-
tained from plaintiff's forn1er ,,~ife, :Jirs. Ethela Berry 
(R. 40). 
Dr. Moench con1plied "~ith this retruest and Exhibit 
3 is the letter which he \YTote at the request of the 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff filed suit N ove1nber 1, 1956, seeking a total 
of $50,000.00 general and punitive da1nages for the al-
leged defamation of character. lTpon issue being joined~ 
the matter vras called for pretrial before District Judge 
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A. H. Ellett, who ruled, as a matter of law, that the 
defendant wrote and sent the letter under a conditional 
privilege (R. 7). 
Plaintiff attacked this ruling by Inotion, which was 
heard by Judge Ellett September 19, 1957, at which time 
the ruling was reaffirmed and the· pretrial order was 
approved as made. (R.8). Subsequently, prior to sub-
mission of the case to the jury, and upon Inotion for new 
trial, plain tiff again attacked the ruling of the trial court 
that a conditional privilege was in effect, and upon each 
occasion the District Court found that such a privilege 
existed and rejected plaintiff's contention. (R.147,155). 
Plaintiff appealed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT, AT BOTH PRETRIAL HEAR-
INGS, AT TRIAL AND UPON THE HEARING OF THE MO-
TION FOR NEW TRIAL, RULED COR.RECTLY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WROTE THE LETTER, EXHIBIT 2, UNDER 
A CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRU·CTED THE 
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUP-
PORTED BY THE RECORD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TI-IE DISTRICT COURT, AT BOTH PRETRIAL HEAR-
INGS, AT TRIAL AND UPON THE HEARING OF THE MO-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
TION FOR NEW TRIAL, RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WROTE THE LETTER, EXHIBIT 2, UNDER 
A ·CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE. 
The rule governing the doctrine of conditional privil-
ege is found in the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 
Section 594, page 242 : 
"An occasion is conditionally privileged when 
the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable 
belief that 
(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently 
important interest of the publisher, and 
"(b) the recipient's kno\vledge of the de-
famatory matter will be of service in the la,vful 
protection of the interest." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has announced its 
approval of this rule as evidenced by the decisions in 
Hales vs. Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, (Utah 
1948), 197 P. 2d 910, and Combes vs. Montgomery Ward 
& Company (Utah, 1951), 228 P. 2d 272. 
These cases are not directly in point on the questions 
presented by this appeal, but exan1ination of the Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 597, page 258, reveals a staten1ent 
of the rule of conditional privilege \Yhich is believed to 
apply directly to this case. It is there stated that a 
conditional privilege arises "~hen circun1stances induce 
a correct or reasonable belief that 
" (a) facts exist ,,~hieh affert the \:veil-being 
of a n1e1nber of the innuediate fa1nily of the re-
cipient or of a third person and 
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H (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defama-
tory matter will be of service in the lawful pro-
tection of such person's well-being and, 
" (c) the recipient has requested the publica-
tion of the defamatory matter or is a person to 
whom its publication is otherwise within generally 
accepted standards of decent conduct." 
Turning now fro1n the applicable rules of law to 
the facts in the case, it is obvious that Dr. Moench, as 
a respected member of his profession, viewed the request 
from Dr. Hellewell as placing him under a medical and 
social duty to transmit the infor1nation in his possession 
to Dr. Hellewell, vvhom he considered to be a marital 
adviser. The information in the defendant's possession 
included not only the facts obtained upon examination 
and interview, but, by the very nature of his profession, 
included his impressions and professional interpretations 
of the facts thus obtained. 
Inasmuch as the condition with which the plaintiff 
had been afflicted had hereditary characteristics, there 
was even greater need for the defendant to fulfill his 
medical and social duty by forwarding such information 
so that Dr. llellewell's patient would be fully advised 
vvhen she made her decision to Inarry or not to marry 
the plaintiff. 
Contrary to the irnplications throughout plaintiff's 
brief, this infor1nation was not being trans1nitted to Dr. 
1-Iellewell for the purpose of advising only the prospec-
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tive father-in-law, but was instead being trans1nitted 
to the doctor to enable him to advise not only the girl's 
father but the girl herself. Consider for a 1noment the 
language of Exhibit 1, in which Dr. Hellewell stated 
that his patient, Mr. Williams had a daughter who was 
considering marriage to lVIr. Berry. His letter then con-
tinues "they are quite concerned about the matter." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Any reading of this letter can lead only to the con-
clusion that "they" referred to Mr. Williams and to his 
daughter, both of whom, so far as Dr. 1foench could 
tell, had apparently sought the advice and help of the 
physician consultant to vvhom the letter \Yas addressed. 
Scarcely a better exan1ple of a n1edical duty or social 
duty could be found than in the present case. For to 
permit a person to marry blindly \Yhen one has informa-
tion of a mental disorder which n1ay, because of its 
hereditary characteristics, affect as yet unborn genera-
tions, would be the n1ost gross violation of 1nedical duty. 
Further, it is clear that Dr. nioench could not have 
performed what he felt to be his duty \Yithout son1e 
description or explanation of the n1eaning of the medical 
diagnosis and the significance of the personal histor:~. 
He knew Dr. Helle\\~t•ll \\~as not a psychiatrist and it 
is obvious that layn1en do not understand the parlance 
of the profession. 
That the defendant's ehoic.e of \Vording no\Y see1ns 
harsh cannot change the basic fact that he had to convey 
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a Ineaning which would be clearly understood. In the 
language of the Restateinent rule, Dr. 1\foench, under 
the circumstances, had a reasonable belief that facts 
existed vvhich affected the well-being of Dr. Hellewell's 
patient, and Dr. Helle\vell could only be of service in 
the lawful protection of that well-being if he clearly 
understood the medical and social significance of Dr. 
~{oench's information. 
The present situation is analagous to the illustration 
found in the comment on the Restatement rule, at page 
260. It is there said: 
"A, a minister, voluntarily vvrites to B, a 
parishioner, telling him that he understands that 
the fiance' of B's daughter is a felon. The occa-
sion is conditionally privileged.'' 
Plaintiff repeatedly attacks the trial court's various 
rulings on conditional privilege by contending that the 
law requires the publisher of defamatory matter to 
have either a pecuniary interest or a public interest, 
which he endeavors to protect when he publishes the 
statements involved. The difficulty with this contention 
is that neither the defendant nor the trial court, nor 
the court upon pretrial hearing, ever based the conten-
tion or ruling of privilege upon these grounds since 
it was felt obvious that the interest which was involved 
was neither pecuniary nor public. 
Rather, the ruling of the District Court was based 
upon the proposition that this case was unlike any case 
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which has heretofore been decided by the Suprerne Court 
of Utah and that the case was comparable to the rules 
set forth in the Restatement of Torts concerning privil-
eges which arise under family or social relationships. 
We urged in the court below, and we reiterate 
here, that this is the kind of case where the defendant 
had reasonable grounds for the belief in the truth of 
the statements he made, and that Dr. Hellewell, the 
person to whom the publication \Yas made, was a person 
vvhose knowledge of the information \Vas reasonably 
believed to be of value for the protection of the well-
being of a member of the immediate family of a third 
person, within the meaning of the Restatement rule 
set forth in Section 597, and the comments band c found 
on pages 258 and 259 of the Restatement of Torts. 
It is apparent that the defendant had every reason-
able ground to believe that he obtained accurate informa-
tion while compiling plaintiff's record in 1949. The testi-
mony is uncontradicted that psychiatrists, by the very 
nature of the patients with whom they deal, must rely 
upon information received fro1n the fa1nilies of such 
patients and there \vas nothing received by the defend-
ant fron1 the plaintiff or his family "Thich in any \Yay 
seemed inconsistent \Yith the i1npressions \Yhich the 
defendant for1ned as he exainined the plaintiff. 
Further, plaintiff's then \vife was "upset" and 
seemed genuinely intere~ted in atte1npting to save her 
n1arriage. There \vould be no reason for any doctor to 
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believe that the staternents that a wife would give under 
::;uch circumstances would be untrue or inaccurate. 
I-Iuman experience indicates that people usually tell the 
truth when, in desperation, they seek medical aid for 
the analysis and solution of a problem which has grown 
to proportions which otherwise would overwhelm them. 
Possibly the best reason that can be asserted in 
support of the contention that the defendant had reason-
able grounds to believe the truth and accuracy of the 
statements he received, is found in the fact that subse-
quent events, including statements made by the plain-
tiff himself, establish the essential truth of such state-
ments. "Vhile every s1nall detail is not admitted by the 
plaintiff himself, it is clear that the statements have 
been substantially confir1ned by the plaintiff, both in 
his interview with Dr. Nelson and in his testimony upon 
the witness stand in this case. 
For example, it was conceded that his father had 
committed suicide and that his brother had been con-
fined to a mental institution because of a mental 
affliction. Further, the plaintiff told Dr. Nelson and 
admitted under cross-examination in this case that he 
gambled and had been in difficulty with the authorities. 
He told Dr. Nelson that he had had "suicidal impulses," 
and that because of drinking and heavy ga1nbling, he 
had become greatly indebted, which led to marital 
discord. ( R. 112, 113, ]jJxhibit 6). F,ro1n his own testimony 
it was shown that in school, while attending the U ni-
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versity of Utah under the G.I. Bill of Rights, he flunked 
two classes in the nine quarters of his attendance, and, 
in addition, he compiled a 1.42 scholastic average. Ac-
cording to University standards of scholarship, which 
are widely publicized, this indicates a grade average of 
only D plus or slightly better, since a 2. average is 
considered equivalent to a C grade. 
Concerning the statements 'vhich Dr. ~ioench found 
jn his record, and therefore inserted in the letter to Dr. 
Hellewell, about the plaintiff's early life, no reason has 
been suggested by plaintiff why such statements should 
not have been accepted by the defendant as being true, 
particularly when it is remembered that, according to 
the record, much of the information contained on the 
record was received in statements made by the plaintiff's 
wife in the presence of the plaintiff without protest 
or argument of any kind fro1n the plaintiff. Its truth 
seems to be further confirmed by an examination of 
the testimony of Dr. Nelson, "Therein the doctor pointed 
out that the psychopathic character, which was his 
diagnostic term, "is formed, is layed down in very early 
years as the psychiatrist sees it. In "That we call the 
formative years fro1n birth up through six, seven and 
eight years of age." (R. 122). 
Thus, the conditions \vhich Dr. Nelson noted in 
1.955, which clearl)T indicated that plaintiff was abnor1nal 
and out of n1ental hn lance, have their origin in early 
childhood and if the basic eharacter disorder is no\Y 
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found to be present, it is obvious that it would have 
been present in the earlier years, at least to some extent. 
If the staten1ents were not true, and if the defendant 
had no reasonable grounds for believing the information 
-w-hich he was given, it is difficult to understand why 
plaintiff then accepted four electro-shock treatments 
without apparent protest. The fact that he took such 
treatments was a further indication to the doctor that 
plain tiff knew of his difficulties and desired to correct 
them. This is all the more reason for Dr. Moench to 
have reasonably believed that his inforrnation, inlpres-
sions and diagnosis were correct. 
Plaintiff attempts to rnake rnuch of the last para-
graph of the letter, Exhibit 2, as indicating that the 
defendant wrote the letter "with the intent ... to paint 
the character of the Jllaintiff as black as possible to 
influence the unknown girl." (Brief P. 23). Why defend-
ant should have had such a rnotive has never been shown, 
and it is clear that the last paragraph of the letter 
constituted nothing rnore than an expression of the 
defendant's belief and understanding of the general con-
duct of people who are afflicted with the same condition 
as was plaintiff, and the results of such conduct upon 
people who do not realize the full implications of that 
condition. The defendant, knowing that Dr. Hellewell 
was not a psychiatrist, was reasonably required to ac-
quaint hin1 \vith the usual result which js encountered 
when people with a psychopathic personality becon1e 
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en1otionally involved with norutal individuals. Had the 
defendant failed, after giving the background facts and 
medical diagnosis, to state in laymen's terms an explana-
tion of the psychiatric significance of the facts and 
diagnosis, he would not have fulfilled his duty, because 
he would have then given Dr. Hellewell only part of 
the story and could not have given hin1 enough to enable 
the doctor to advise his patients intelligently concerning 
the nature and extent of the problem with which they 
\vere confronted. 
Even if the doctrine of conditional privilege were 
unknown to the law, we submit that, in answer to a 
professional inquiry, the defendant performed a social 
and medical responsibility well within generally accepted 
standards of decent conduct. We believe his duty required 
hiu1 to disclose his record and his opinion, completely 
and frankly, since, to have withheld the full story, to 
have given less than the truth, to have "sugar-coated" 
his opinion, vvould have been to perform a disservice 
to the inquiring doctor and his patients. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRU·CTED THE 
JURY AND ITS VERDICT IS OVERWHELMINGLY SUP-
P·ORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The second and third points of plaintiff's brief relate 
to clailned errors in certain instructions to the jury, 
and to the refusal of the trial eourt to give t'vo of 
plaintiff's reque~ted ]n~truetions. I-Io,vever, since plain-
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tiff's requested instructions were not designated by hirn 
as part of the record, and were not set forth nor dis-
cussed in his brief, our discussion will be directed to 
the alleged errors in the instructions actually submitted 
to the jury. 
After reiterating hi:::; contention that a conditional 
privilege did not exist, plaintiff next says that the court's 
instruction No. 9 erroneously informed the jury that 
plaintiff had the burden of proving actual rnalice, that 
actual malice had to be shovvn by evidence apart frorn 
the defamatory letter itself, and that if plaintiff failed 
to prove that the defendant wrote the letter because 
of spite, ill will, or hatred toward plaintiff, defendant 
would not be liable. 
Plaintiff apparently concedes that the language of 
the instruction is patterned after the discussion by this 
Court in Combes v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 
(Utah, 1951) 228 P. 2d 272, but he contends that here 
"the facts are different." Of course the facts are dif-
ferent, but the principle of law involved remains un-
changed. It is in the failure to recognize this principle 
that the weakness of plaintiff's argurnent is most pro-
nounced. 
As defined in the Combe:; case, the principle is 
that there is a distinction between the malice that is 
·t :> be inferred from every defamatory statement and 
the malice that must be proved if the protection of 
:·Dnditional privilege is to be overcome. The Court said 
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that a "privileged communication" constitutes "an ex-
ception to the rule that every such defan1atory publica-
tion implies malice." 
The Court went on to quote with evident approval 
a Texas decision in which it was said: 
"'This kind of malice . . . which overcomes 
and destroys the privilege, is, of course, quite 
distinct from that which the law, in the first 
instance, imputes with respect to every defama-
tory charge, irrespective of motive. It has been 
defined to be an 'indirect and ·wicked motive which 
induces the defendant to defame the plaintiff.'" 
National Standard Life Ins. Co. L·. Billington, 
89 s.w. 2d 491. 
The rule for which plaintiff contends - that every 
defamatory statement furnishes its own proof of malice 
-would strike down the doctrine of conditional privilege 
and render it meaningless. It would require a defendant 
to prove affir1natively that he had no 1nalice, which 
is to require hin1 to prove a negative. Such a rule 'Yould 
defy the public policy upon ''Thich the entire structure 
of privilege, in the la'v of defa1nation, has been based. 
~rhis is a public policy: 
"which recognizes that it is essential that 
true infor1nation shall be giYen "Thenever it is 
reasonably IH:•re~sar~T for the protection of one's 
own interests, the inh•rests of third persons, or 
certain interP~ts of thP public. T n order that such 
inforutation ntn)r hP fl'eel~,. given, it is necessary 
to afford protection against liability for 1ni~-
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infor1nation given in an honest and reasonable 
effort to protect or advance the interest in ques-
tion. Were such protection not given, true infor-
Ination which should be given or received would 
not be communicated through fear of the persons 
capable of giving it that they would be held 
liable in an action for defamation unless they 
could meet the heavy burden of satisfying a jury 
that their statements were true." Restatement of 
the Law-Torts, Conditional Privilege, p. 240. 
While the Combes case announced the principle 
followed by the trial court in this case, it is not the 
first decision of our Supreme Court in which the doctrine 
may be found. In 1933, the Court had before it an 
entire series of newspaper articles and editorials which 
defamed the competency and integrity of a public official. 
Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub. Co., 27 P. 2d 1. 
The defamatory language is set forth in great detail 
in the opinion, and even a cursory exarnination will 
reveal that the plaintiff in that case was lashed with 
criticism, comment and condemnation which was far 
more harsh, violent and defamatory than any of the 
language involved in the case at bar. 
It was clairned in the Williams case, as here, that 
the publication itself was evidence of the existence of 
actual rnalice. In disposing of that contention, this Court 
said: 
~·rt is true that so1ne of the language used 
. \ra::-; severP, but that alone, as \Ye have here-
tofore indicated, is not sufficient to support a 
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finding that the 1uotive which IJrornpted the writ-
ing of the article declared on was actual malice." 
The W illiar~ts case also furnishes an ans\ver to 
plaintiff's next contention which is that the trial court 
erred in telling the jury, in Instructions 10 and 11, that 
it n1ight exonerate the defendant if it found that the 
defendant made the statements in his letter ""W-ith prob-
able cause and a reasonable belief that they were true. 
Concerning probable cause, the Williams decision said: 
"The authorities, however, are all to the ef-
fect that the presence of probable cause for 
believing the truth of a qualifiedly privileged 
cornn1unication is important as evidence of good 
faith and of the absence of malice in fact." 
With reference to the term "reasonable belief," it 
IS significant that the Restatement of Torts, in nearly 
all the sections on conditional privilege, prefaces each 
rule with this phrase: "An occasion is conditionally 
privileged when the circumstances induce a correct or 
reasonable belief . . ." ( en1phasis added) See pp. 2±2, 
et seq. 
Plaintiff, however, disregards all such fundamental 
pronouncements in his dogged insi8tence, throughout 
his brief, that the letter itself sho,ys 1nalice and ill "\Yill 
toward plaintiff. Never does he even suggest the slightest 
reason why the defendant should have had such a 
feeling about a patient "\Yhon1 he could not even re-
rnember, and "rith ~rhorn he had had no contact for 
nearly seven yt>arH. .A~ th<> { iourt eonnnented, in the 
Williarns case, in allS\\'ering a silnilar contention: 
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Hit is rare indeed that ill will is nourished 
for a period of eighteen or twenty months and 
then 1nanifests itself in a slander or libel." 
If this be so, vv-hat possible basis can be found for 
the claiin that, after nearly seven years, defendant viewed 
plaintiff with Inalice ~ ~ro state the question is to answer 
it. 
Defendant could safely rest his defense upon the 
principles heretofore outlined, but he need not do so, 
for the record in this case conclusively shows another, 
and absolute, defense to plaintiff's claiin. That is the 
defense of truth. 
Substantially every statement in defendant's letter 
has been shown to have been true, and to have been 
true, either at the time the letter was written or within 
the immediate past. Defendant was not required to show 
the literal truth of what he said, particularly when he 
was dealing with a professional opinion and diagnosis. 
It is enough for a successful defense if, from the entire 
record, it can be said that the state1nents were substan-
tially true. This is exemplified by Crellin v. Thomas 
(Utah, 1952) 247 P. 2d 264, in which it was said: 
"Adinittedly, when truth is pleaded in justifi-
cation, it is not necessary to prove the literal 
truth of the precise state1nent Inade. Slight in-
accuracieH of Pxpression are iinJnaterial, provid-
ing that the defainatory charge is true in sub-
stance." 
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Plaintiff'B 1nental condition, per~onal habits, family 
life, school life, record during the war years, gambling 
habits and unstable tendencies form the substance of 
the letter in suit. All of these subjects vv-ere discussed 
and admitted by plaintiff himself, either to Dr. Nelson, 
or to the jury from the witness stand. Plaintiff admits 
this statement, it would seem, because his brief com-
pletely ignores his own testimony and the uncontra-
dited testimony of Dr. Nelson. Instead of explaining 
or minilnizing this evidence, he hanuners a\vay at the 
statement in defendant's letter to the effect that in 
view of plaintiff's modest financial circumstances, only 
a "token charge" had been 1nade for the services of 
the Salt Lake Clinic, and "even that" had never been 
paid. 
The difficulty with this position is found in the 
fact that the evidence is undisputed that the bill had 
never been paid in full, and collection of the balance 
had been referred to a collection agency. True, only 
10% remained unpaid, but, in the light of the context 
of the letter and the concession on the bill \Yhen originally 
charged, it vvas not only reasonable, but perfectly accur-
ate for the defendant to n1ake the staten1ent that the 
bill had not been paid. 
Plaintiff repeatedly assails defendant's reliance 
upon the inforr11ation he rereiYcd fro1n plaintiff's fa1nily 
at the ti1ne of the consultation and treat1nent in 1949. 
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It is urged that to rely upon such inforrnation is to 
base a diagnosis and an opinion upon hearsay. Finally 
it is claimed that no one could reasonably believe the 
truth of information gathered in this fashion. 
Plaintiff's argument rnight have force if it were 
not for the uncontradicted evidence that in the practice 
of psychiatry, a doctor necessarily must rely upon infor-
mation so obtained, since it is often the only reliable 
information available. Plaintiff's argument also loses 
its entire force in the light of later developments, since 
it was shown conclusively, and without even an attempt 
at contradiction, that substantially the same information 
which plaintiff now attacks as hearsay was given to 
Dr. Nelson in 1955 when plaintiff, acting on his own 
and without the insistence of his wife or family, consulted 
the doctor in an effort to find out what was wrong 
with him, and at a tirne when he was in obvious need 
of help. 
It is significant that at no tirne, either in the lower 
court nor in his brief in this court, has plaintiff ever 
asserted that what he told Dr. Nelson about his past 
life, his personal problems and habits, was untrue. If 
he now claims that such inforrnation was untrue, or not 
susceptible of a reasonable belief that it was true, he 
rnust supply evidence to support such an assertion, but 
this he wholly failed to do. 
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CONCLUSION 
We believe it has been clearly deinonstrated that 
plaintiff presented no evidence of actual malice, no 
evidence supplying a motive for malice, and no evidence 
to rebut the defense of truth. It is equally plain that 
t~1e trial court instructed the jury in accordance \Yith 
long-established principles announced in the decisions 
of this Court. 
Despite this state of the record, plaintiff claims 
he should be granted a reversal of the judgment because, 
somehow and some way, the law ought to provide a 
remedy for so "palpable" a \vrong. The complete ans\ver 
is that the law does indeed provide a remedy when there 
is evidence to support it but we know of no theory or 
authority, and plaintiff cites none, \Yhich \Yill enable a 
remedy to ripen into judgment unsupported by fact 
or by law. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
JOHN H. SNO\\r and SI(EEN, 
WORSLEY, SKO\V. & CHRISTEKSEN 
Atto,rneys for Respondent 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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